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Gordon Tullock starts his latest book with a discussion of several myths surrounding the issue 
of voting. He points out that most people think that majority voting is the best method of 
making government decisions, while they also believe that juries should make their decisions 
by unanimous votes. Tullock emphasizes that Lincoln, Wilson and Clinton were elected by a 
minority of the voters. Does 'democracy' mean that all adults, with the possible exception of 
criminals, are permitted to vote? Tullock also discusses cases in which only few people can 
vote, so his book is called 'On Voting' and not 'On Democracy'. In Chapter 3, Tullock 
discusses the relevance of the paradox of voting. He presents a special case of Arrow's 
theorem which allows a drastically simplified proof. However, this comes at the cost of the 
additional condition that if a voting method is used to select between 2 alternatives, then it 
will select the one preferred by a majority. In any case, noting that Condorcet cycles are quite 
rare in the real world ("most formal voting is made on a simple up or down two-sided choice 
in which event the Arrow theorem does not apply", p.64), in the rest of his book Tullock 
addresses important issues which so far have received less attention in the (formal) literature.  
 
By what methods are the alternatives to be chosen among by the voting process pre-selected? 
Tullock notes that often subjects suddenly pop up, are important for a while, and then 
disappear. A theory explaining this phenomenon would clearly be desirable. Tullock 
discusses the important issue of log-rolling in detail. Log-rolling is a trade among voters in 
which they agree to vote against something that they actually favor in return for somebody 
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else assisting them getting something they want. Suppose first that votes cannot be traded. It 
is true that majority voting over two alternatives is optimal whenever everyone is equally 
displeased if he or she does not get his or her will. But if the intensities of pleasure and 
displeasure are different, majority voting is not optimal. Now assume that votes can be traded. 
If there were no bargaining costs, then the unanimity rule would always be optimal (i.e., 
minimize the amount of displeasure in the society). However, since in practice there are 
bargaining costs, Tullock advocates a less-than-unanimity (but still more-than-majority) rule. 
Tullock points out that in general cash payments are illegal, so that bargaining can be done 
either explicitly by exchange of promises -- voter 1 agrees to vote for bill B tomorrow if voter 
2 will vote for bill A today -- or implicitly by creating a new combined bill AB. With open 
voting the exchange of promises is obviously more effective then with secret voting. Tullock 
sees little difference between explicit and implicit log-rolling. He argues that the "end product 
is that log-rolling which is dominant in all democratic societies leads to outcomes that are 
efficient in the same sense that market outcomes are efficient" (p. 139), i.e., efficient given 
the existence of transaction costs.  
 
Throughout the book and also in a special appendix, Tullock discusses a bouquet of different 
voting methods such as the English system by which the legislature is selected by voting in 
each constituency and the system of proportional representation. He personally likes a two 
chamber legislature with one chamber elected according to the English system and the other 
according to the proportional representation system, but his favorite form of voting is demand 
revealing, which permits individuals to indicate the intensity of their desires.  
 
Gordon Tullock has once again written an insightful and stimulating book. While political 
scientists who are not familiar with the public choice literature will find the book accessible, 
it can also be recommended to public choice scholars who are interested in suggestions for 
future research. There are several typographic errors, but this is only a minor point. I think 
Tullock's style -- he regularly tells anecdotes --  make his books quite entertaining, but some 
readers might prefer a somewhat clearer structure of the reasoning. Tullock repeats several 
points which he considers to be important several times throughout the book, while it is not 
always obvious to me why certain points are discussed where they are discussed. E.g., the 
question 'who should vote' appears in the second half of the chapter on 'Direct voting with 
log-rolling'.  
 
 3
By the way, Tullock suggests that civil servants and their families should be deprived from 
voting, since they might vote to improve their wages. I am not sure whether this were 
obviously suboptimal. The argument reminds me somewhat of Tullock's famous rent-seeking 
idea. The social loss of a monopoly is traditionally believed to be the Harberger triangle only 
(since decreasing consumers' rent while increasing the monopolist's profit is just 
redistribution), but Tullock argued that the social loss is also the rectangle that represents the 
monopolist's rent, since the monopolist may e.g. have to bribe a politician to get the 
monopoly. However, is the bribe really lost, or isn't it also just redistribution? Obviously, 
further arguments along the lines of the traditional deadweight loss analysis are needed in 
order to establish the inefficiency of rent-seeking. Such additional arguments also seem to be 
necessary in order to show that  redistribution in favor of civil servants is suboptimal.  
 
As far as log-rolling is concerned, I agree that it plays an important role when the number of 
voters is small. However, when there are millions of voters, bargaining costs usually 
outweigh the benefits (one formal argument can be found in Mailath and Postlewaite, 1990), 
and I wonder whether in this case one can generally argue in favor of more-than-majority 
rules. For example, assume that utilities can simply be added in a private value setting, and let 
the utility of everyone in the status quo (e.g., smoking is permitted) be normalized to 0.  If the 
status quo is changed (e.g., smoking is prohibited), some voters gain and have a utility of v>0, 
while others loose and have a utility of -w<0. It is straightforward to see that the optimal 
quorum (which leads to a change whenever the sum of the utilities is positive) is given by 
w/(v+w). Of course, if v=w, then majority voting is optimal, as has been pointed out by 
Tullock (p. 77). However, in general the optimal quorum in this simple example can be larger 
than ½ (if v<w) or smaller than ½ (if v>w). See also Schweizer (1990).  
 
One issue that Tullock unfortunately does not discuss is the idea that (majority) voting can be 
an efficient means to aggregate information in a common value setting (the utility of every 
voter is v if we change the status quo, but no one knows v exactly; different voters have 
different signals about v). This idea has received some interest in the recent literature which 
(in contrast to the traditional literature on the Condorcet Jury Theorem) assumes rational 
(instead of sincere or naive) voting (see Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996, and the literature 
cited there).  It would be interesting to know how Tullock judges the relevance of this (very 
technical) literature.  
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It is true that log-rolling plays a major role in coalition governments, which are the rule in 
many European countries including Germany. It is clearly desirable to study coalition 
contracts in more detail. I have studied one rather unusual clause of such a contract in 
Schmitz (1998). There I assumed as a shortcut that direct cash payments are made. As 
Tullock points out, such an assumption "makes the analysis much simpler" (p. 155). 
Nevertheless it may be worthwhile to analyze whether barter trade always leads to 
inefficiencies, or whether it may even be welfare-enhancing (see Prendergast and Stole, 
1999).  
 
Finally, for me it is interesting to note that Tullock argues that the German voting method, 
which is a compromise between the English system and proportional representation and 
which has been copied by Italy, New Zealand, Japan, and Russia, is "bizarre" (p. 182).  I 
agree with Tullock.  In fact, polls before elections regularly show that many German voters 
simply do not understand the complicated German system in which each citizen casts two 
votes.  Clarity and simplicity seem to be important requirements a voting method should 
fulfill.  
 
To summarize, Gordon Tullock, who certainly knows how to handle critics ("Those who 
object to log-rolling are simply objecting to it because they have not thought about the matter 
very much", p. 131), has once again written a highly recommendable book in an entertaining 
style. This book is a valuable addition to the impressive work (see Durden, Ellis, and 
Millsaps, 1991) done by one of the pioneers of public choice.   
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